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 V. STATES SHOULD MANDATE METRO-WIDE DESEGREGATION 
CONSISTENT WITH KENNEDY’S  GUIDANCE IN PARENTS 
INVOLVED ................................................................................ 973 
 
America must realize that purging the taint of racism 
requires more than color blindness and race neutrality in 
a free market.  Color-blind remedies are also blind to the 
historical fact that the law sanctioned racial oppression for 
centuries.  Because blacks suffered and whites prospered 
as classes, any realistic remedy must also be class-
based. . . . America must reject out of hand any policies 
that tend to separate the races.1
In June 2007, the United States Supreme Court came within 
one vote of ending school integration and moving to the type of 
race-neutral, free-market remedy to educational inequality that 
Judge Gerald W. Heaney warned against in 1985.
 
 
2  The non-
binding portion of Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 
asserts that states may only remedy racial imbalance in its schools 
caused by intentional discrimination, and proactive efforts to 
integrate schools racially should be left to parental choice.3  But the 
majority of the Supreme Court still endorses mandatory, proactive 
strategies to prevent resegregation.4  Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Parents Involved acknowledges that race-conscious 
decision-making is still necessary and rejects the plurality’s 
colorblind approach.5
 
 1. Gerald W. Heaney, Busing, Timetables, Goals, and Ratios: Touchstones of 
Equal Opportunity, 69 MINN. L. REV. 735, 819–20 (1985).  Authors Hobday and 
Orfield clerked for the Honorable Gerald W. Heaney, whose cautionary words still 
provide guidance today.  This article is a tribute to Heaney, the fine jurist who 
oversaw the school desegregation cases in St. Louis and Kansas City during his 
tenure on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Judge Heaney has also co-
authored a history of the St. Louis case.  See GERALD W. HEANEY & SUSAN 
UCHITELLE, UNENDING STRUGGLE: THE LONG ROAD TO AN EQUAL EDUCATION IN ST. 
LOUIS (2004). 
 2. The non-controlling portions of Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion 
in Parents Involved expressed the belief that states do not have a “compelling 
interest” in racially balanced schools under a Fourteenth Amendment analysis.  
127 S. Ct. 2738, 2757 (2007). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 2791–92, 2811–20 (Kennedy, J., concurring, Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(Justice Breyer is joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg). 
 5. Id. at 2791–92 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
  Kennedy’s opinion provides at least limited 
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avenues for states to address racial isolation6 in their schools, 
including the explicit consideration of race in the drawing of 
attendance boundaries and in the decisions to open and close 
schools.7  The Court’s holding, therefore, does not require school 
districts to resort to choice-based integration programs.  Yet, a 
growing number of states have been moving in that direction in the 
wake of declining court oversight over desegregation programs.8  
While educational choice can serve some public good, there is 
reason to be cautious about integration plans that rely heavily on 
the voluntary decision-making of local school boards and parents.9
Nearly ten years ago, Minnesota adopted choice-based school 
integration rules.  The results have been disastrous.  Minnesota, the 
land of Hubert Humphrey
 
10 and Roy Wilkins,11
 
 6. Adopting Justice Kennedy’s articulation of the states’ compelling interest 
in addressing racial isolation, this article speaks primarily in terms of “racial 
isolation” and “racial balance” to describe the state of Minnesota schools.  In 
doing so, we do not accept that racial balance, or desegregation, is the same thing 
as integration.  This is Justice Thomas’s view in Parents Involved.  Id. at 2769 n.2 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  True integration of public schools requires much more 
than numerical balancing of schools’ racial compositions.  See, e.g., John A. Powell, 
The Tensions Between Integration and School Reform, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 655, 681 
(2001) (“Educational integration is the systemic transformation of a school to 
create a diverse and inclusive environment within the school and the curricula, 
achieved through a variety of reforms.”).  But the elimination of racially isolated 
schools—having schools with racial compositions that better reflect our racially 
diverse society—is a first and necessary step for metropolitan districts concerned 
with integrating their schools.  Id. (“‘We must always be aware of the fact that our 
ultimate goal is integration, and that desegregation is only a first step on the road 
to the good society . . . .’”) (quoting MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE ETHICAL 
DEMANDS FOR INTEGRATION (1962)). 
 7. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 8. GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL 
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 20–22 (1996); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Susan 
Eaton, From Little Rock to Seattle and Louisville: Is “All Deliberate Speed” Stuck in 
Reverse?, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 279, 291 (2008) (describing actions to end 
school desegregation programs in the wake of Parents Involved); Sean F. Reardon & 
John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating Schools: The Retreat from School 
Desegregation in the South, 1990–2000, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH 
TURN BACK? 51 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005); Charles T. 
Clotfelter et al., Do Southern Schools Face Rapid Resegregation?: Segregation and 
Resegregation in North Carolina’s Public School Classrooms, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1463, 1463–
96 (2003).  
 9. Powell, supra note 6, at 671–80 (outlining a strong critique of school 
choice models). 
 a state with a 
 10. Hubert Humphrey, Jr. served two terms as a Minnesota Senator and 
served as Vice President under Lyndon B. Johnson.  Humphrey is remembered for 
his support of and leadership in the Civil Rights Era.  See generally TIMOTHY N. 
THURBER, THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY: HUBERT H. HUMPHREY AND THE AFRICAN 
3
Hobday et al.: A Missed Opportunity: Minnesota's Failed Experiment with Choice-b
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
2009] CHOICE-BASED INTEGRATION IN EDUCATION 939 
powerful and longstanding tradition of Republican support of civil 
rights and known for its progressive education policies,12 chose its 
voluntary integration rules over an alternative proposal that 
mandated racial integration in all public schools and sanctioned 
noncompliant schools and districts.  The alternative proposal was 
drafted by a select panel of school district representatives and civil 
rights advocates and was endorsed by both the State Board of 
Education and the state legislature.13
Attempting to predict changes to the Supreme Court’s 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, Minnesota thought the 
Court would not find racially integrated schools to be a compelling 
governmental interest and that the state could not, therefore, 
mandate race-based integration.
  Instead of implementing 
rules that mandate racial integration, Minnesota opted for rules 
that rely almost exclusively on parental choice and school districts’ 
voluntary efforts. 
14  Yet, Minnesota’s approach is not 
colorblind, as the rules require significant reporting of race-based 
data.  The rules do not require districts to avoid racial isolation 
proactively or to remedy racial imbalance unless it is proven to be 
caused by intentional discrimination.15  The rules instead rely on 
the voluntary efforts of districts, schools, and parents for racial 
integration of public schools.16
After nearly ten years of Minnesota’s educational school-
choice experiment, segregation in Minnesota schools has only 
  This is their fatal flaw. 
 
AMERICAN FREEDOM STRUGGLE (Columbia Univ. Press ed., 1998). 
 11. Roy Wilkins was a crusading leader in the civil rights movement.  Julian 
Bond, Introduction to STANDING FAST: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY WILKINS ix, x (Da 
Capo Press ed., 1994).  Among his many accomplishments, Wilkins also served as 
Executive Director of the NAACP from 1964 to 1977.  Id.  Wilkins moved to St. 
Paul as a child and later graduated from the University of Minnesota in 1923; he 
worked in the Twin Cities thereafter.  Id. at x–xi. 
 12. See Karen Evans Stout & Byron Stevens, The Case of the Failed Diversity Rule: 
A Multiple Stream Analysis, 22 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 341, 342–43 
(2000) (observing that “Minnesota has enjoyed a reputation for leadership in 
education policy circles” and that it has a “progressive legacy”); Tim L. Mazzoni, 
The Changing Politics of State Education Policy Making: A 20-Year Minnesota Perspective, 
15 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 357, 361 (1993) (“Minnesota’s political 
culture has often been lauded for its grassroots participation, governmental 
effectiveness, and policy innovations.”). 
 13. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 14. See infra Part III.D. 
 15. See MINN. R. 3535.0150 (2007); MINN. R. 3535.0160 (2007).  See also infra 
Part II.B and accompanying notes. 
 16. See Minn. R. 3535.0160 (2007); MINN. R. 3535.0170 (2007).  See also infra 
Part II.B. 
4
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intensified—its students of color have steadily become more 
isolated in high-poverty, low-performing schools.17  Minnesota is 
moving away from providing a racially integrated education for all 
of its students.  Whether the rules themselves caused the increased 
racial isolation or merely allowed it to happen, Minnesota’s 
experience shows the danger of removing integration mandates.  
Minnesota’s experience suggests that if educational equity for all 
students is the goal, there must be a compelling interest in 
proactively addressing racial isolation in schools and that states 
must mandate, rather than just encourage, integration.  Choice-
based integration plans will only continue the national trend of 
resegregation of our nation’s schools.18
Part I summarizes the United States Supreme Court’s most 
recent school-integration case, clarifying that a majority of the 
current Court still permits states to mandate change in the face of 
racial isolation in their schools.
 
This article advocates that states address racial isolation rather 
than wait for the inevitable.  States must mandate consideration of 
race in their educational policies so that public schools begin to 
reflect the racial diversity of this nation and so all students can 
benefit from education in a racially integrated setting. 
19  Part I also highlights the benefits 
of racially integrated schools.20  Part II outlines Minnesota’s current 
choice-based integration rules and documents the increasing 
segregation of students of color in Twin Cities schools.21  Part III 
traces the history of Minnesota’s decision to adopt choice-based 
integration, illustrating that the state’s decision has proved 
ineffective for its schools and should not serve as the model for 
other states.22
 
 17. See infra Part II.C. 
 18. Today, while demographic trends mean that fewer white students attend 
white-segregated schools, a growing number of blacks and Latino students attend 
minority-segregated schools—a fact that is not accounted for by increasing racial 
diversity.  Despite this increasing diversity, the average white student attends a 
school that is 77% white.  See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HISTORIC REVERSALS, 
ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES 
21–30 (2007), http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/reversals_ 
reseg_need.pdf.  Conversely, the average black or Hispanic/Latino student attends 
a school that is more than half black and Latino.  Id. 
 19. See infra Part I.A. 
 20. See infra Part I.B. 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
  In particular, this section documents the dramatic 
increase in racial isolation in Minnesota schools since the adoption 
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of choice-based integration rules. 
Part IV employs two examples to explain how Minnesota’s 
approach provides little support for school districts attempting to 
integrate their schools affirmatively and leaves the state powerless 
to do anything when school districts make attendance-area 
decisions that will inevitably lead to, and cause, increased racial 
isolation in schools.23  Part V concludes that Minnesota—and any 
state where integration policies fail to affect change in the face of 
increasing racial isolation—must modify its rules to mandate 
districts to consider race when making attendance-area decisions 
and to draw such lines in a manner that will maximize racial 
integration in the schools.24
I. STATES HAVE A COMPELLING INTEREST IN ADDRESSING RACIAL 
ISOLATION IN K-12 EDUCATION 
 
A. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Parents Involved 
Any discussion of state efforts to integrate its schools racially 
must acknowledge the Supreme Court’s most recent decision on 
the issue in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1.25  The case is particularly important in a discussion of 
Minnesota’s choice-based integration rules because Minnesota’s 
underlying rationale for implementing the rules was its prediction of 
what the Supreme Court would say about states’ voluntary 
integration plans.26
In Parents Involved, the Court struck down Seattle’s and 
Louisville’s race-based plans, which proactively integrated their 
public schools, holding that the plans were not sufficiently tailored 
to pass a strict-scrutiny analysis.
 
27  Led by Chief Justice Roberts, four 
other justices also proclaimed that states do not have a “compelling 
interest” in addressing racial isolation in K-12 education.28
 
 23. See infra Part IV. 
 24. See infra Part V. 
 25. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 26. See infra Part III.D. 
 27. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760; id. at 2790–91 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 28. Id. at 2757–58 (Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion); id. at 2768–69 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
  These 
four justices, two of whom were not on the Court when Minnesota 
adopted its current rules, would continue to limit race-conscious 
6
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policies in K-12 education to only those situations where they are 
necessary to remedy intentional discrimination.29  Ironically, they 
rely on Brown v. Board of Education30 to accomplish this.31  By 
limiting Brown to its particular facts, they conclude that only state-
mandated racial separation in schools is prohibited.32  According to 
these four justices, racially isolated schools are legally equal as long 
as they cannot be directly tied to intentional discrimination by the 
state.33  States cannot remedy de facto racial isolation.34  To do so, in 
the words of Justice Roberts (but again not joined by a majority of 
the Court), would be to continue “discriminating on the basis of 
race.”35
 
 29. See id. at 2752 (noting that “‘the Constitution is not violated by racial 
imbalance in the schools, without more.’” (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 
267, 280 n.14 (1977))).  Justice Thomas would further limit this remedial interest 
to only those situations “in which a school district has a ‘history of maintaining two 
sets of schools in a single school system deliberately operated to carry out a 
governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race.’”  Id. 
at 2771 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1971)).  Justice Thomas further stated, “[i]n most cases, 
there either will or will not have been a state constitutional amendment, state 
statute, local ordinance, or local administrative policy explicitly requiring 
separation of the races.”  Id. at 2771 n.4.  In other words, Justice Thomas would 
limit this interest to addressing only discrimination of the blatant type that existed 
during the Jim Crow era. 
 30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 31. The plurality’s analysis has been criticized as an “astonishing attempt to 
rewrite the history of desegregation and to use Brown as a justification for blocking 
efforts to integrate schools.”  James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary 
Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 133 (2007).  Justice Stevens, in his dissent, writes 
that “[t]here is a cruel irony in THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s reliance on our decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education.”  Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Breyer states that the plurality “undermines Brown’s promise 
of integrated primary and secondary education that local communities have 
sought to make a reality.”  Id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 32. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767–68; id. at 2769 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 33. Id. at 2767–68; id. at 2769 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 34. Id. at 2767–68; id. at 2786 n.27 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 35. Id. at 2768.  Roberts’s plurality opinion reflects the opinion of 
Minnesota’s legal advisor at the time the current desegregation rules were 
implemented.  The Office of the Attorney General predicted that the Supreme 
Court might rule in this manner and therefore recommended that the state adopt 
rules that do not require school districts to remedy racial isolation proactively in 
their schools unless it could be proven that such isolation was caused by intentional 
discrimination.  See infra Part III.D.  The state’s legal analysis similarly limited 
Brown to its facts, criticizing an expanded reading of the underlying significance of 
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The majority of today’s Court, however, rejects these parts of 
the plurality opinion and explicitly recognizes that states have a 
compelling interest to address racial isolation in their schools.  
Justice Kennedy characterizes Justice Roberts’s “postulate that 
‘[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race . . .’” as too simplistic.36
Fifty years of experience since Brown . . . should teach us 
that the problem before us defies so easy a solution.  
School districts can seek to reach Brown’s objective of 
equal educational opportunity.  The plurality opinion is at 
least open to the interpretation that the Constitution 
requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto 
resegregation in schooling.  I cannot endorse that 
conclusion.  To the extent the plurality opinion suggests 
the Constitution mandates that state and local school 
authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in 
schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.
  He 
explains: 
37
This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its 
historic commitment to creating an integrated society that 
ensures equal opportunity for all of its children.  A 
compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an 
interest that a school district, in its discretion and 
expertise, may choose to pursue.
 
Justice Kennedy concludes this section of his opinion with a strong 
statement in favor of states’ interest and right to address racial 
isolation in their schools: 
38
Justice Breyer—in his dissenting opinion joined by Justices 
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg—identified Seattle’s and Louisville’s 
interest as “greater racial integration of public schools” or the 
“districts’ interest in eliminating school-by-school racial isolation 
and increasing the degree to which racial mixture characterizes 
each of the district’s schools and each individual student’s public 
school experience.”
 
39  Breyer agreed that such an interest is 
compelling because it addresses consequences of prior conditions 
of segregation,40
 
 36. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 39. Id. at 2801, 2820 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 40. Id. at 2820 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 seeks to overcome “the adverse educational effects 
8
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produced by and associated with highly segregated schools,”41 and 
promotes “an educational environment that reflects the ‘pluralistic 
society’ in which our children will live.”42  Breyer concludes, “[i]f 
an educational interest that combines these three elements is not 
‘compelling,’ what is?”43
B. Demonstrated Benefits of Racially Integrated Schools 
 
Social science research continues to support the state’s 
compelling interest in pursuing racially integrated education.  
Integrated schools give all students access to social networks that 
are connected to opportunity and social mobility.44  Minority 
students who graduate from desegregated schools have higher 
career aspirations than students who attend segregated schools and 
tend to choose more lucrative occupations in which minorities are 
historically underrepresented.45  Black male students that attend 
desegregated schools tend to complete more years of education46 
and have higher college attendance rates.47  The demonstrated 
benefits of integration for students of color include improved test 
scores,48 higher graduation rates,49
 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 2821 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)). 
 43. Id. at 2823 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 44. Mark Granovetter, The Micro-Structure of School Desegregation, in SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION RESEARCH: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS 99–107 
(Jeffrey Prager, Douglas Longshore & Melvin Seeman eds., 1986).   
 45. ROBERT L. CRAIN & JACK STRAUSS, CTR. FOR SOC. ORG. OF SCH., SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION AND BLACK OCCUPATIONAL ATTAINMENTS: RESULTS FROM A LONG-
TERM EXPERIMENT 15, 27–28 (1985).  See also Jomills H. Braddock & James M. 
McPartland, How Minorities Continue To Be Excluded from Equal Employment 
Opportunities: Research on Labor Market and Institutional Barriers, 43 J. SOC. ISSUES 5, 
11 (1987) (concluding that “segregated [social] networks lead to poor-paying, 
more segregated jobs . . . and desegregated [social] networks lead to better paying, 
less segregated work.”). 
 46. CRAIN & STRAUSS, supra note 45, at 26–28. 
 47. Id.  
 higher post-graduation 
 48. Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Segregation and the SAT, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 157, 175 
(2006) (noting that segregation negatively affects SAT scores); Kathryn M. 
Borman et al., Accountability in a Postdesegregation Era: The Continuing Significance of 
Racial Segregation in Florida’s Schools, 41 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 605, 622 (2004); Roslyn 
Arlin Mickelson, The Academic Consequences of Desegregation and Segregation: Evidence 
from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1513, 1546 (2003) (noting that 
“the more time both black and white students spend in desegregated elementary 
schools, the higher their standardized test scores in middle and high school . . . 
.”); Geoffrey D. Borman & N. Maritza Dowling, Schools and Inequality: A Multilevel 
Analysis of Coleman’s Equality of Educational Opportunity Data 42 (April 2006) 
9
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incomes,50 and better life opportunities.51  With respect to white 
students, integration does not negatively affect their performance,52 
improves critical thinking skills,53 reduces racial prejudice,54 and 
prepares students for life in a multiracial society.55
Racially segregated schools do not offer students equal 
opportunity; instead they expose students to a culture of 
intergenerational poverty and its attendant challenges.  Non-white, 
economically segregated schools “often transmit lower expectations 
to minority students and offer a narrower range of educational and 
job-related options.”
 
56  Racially segregated, non-white schools are 
almost always high-poverty schools.57  High-poverty schools typically 
have less qualified and less experienced teachers, more limited, less 
challenging curriculums, and produce lower educational 
expectations.58  Perhaps most importantly, integrated schools 
decrease racial prejudice among students and facilitate positive, 
interracial relations.59
 
(unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Educational Research Association) (on file with authors). 
 49. Michael A. Boozer et al., Race and School Quality Since Brown v. Board of 
Education, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 269, 305 
(Martin Neil Bailey & Clifford M. Winston eds., 1992). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Granovetter, supra note 44, at 81–110. 
 52. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS 
SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 228–257 (2001). 
 53. Anthony Lising Antonio et al., Effects of Racial Diversity on Complex Thinking 
in College Students, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 509 (2004). 
 54. Thomas Pettigrew & Linda Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact 
Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 766 (2006). 
 55. See Jomills H. Braddock II, Robert L. Crain & James M. McPartland, A 
Long-Term View of School Desegregation: Some Recent Studies of Graduates as Adults, 66 
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 262 (1984) (citing Richard Scott & James M. McPartland, 
Desegregation as National Policy: Correlates of Racial Attitudes, 19 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 397–
414 (1982)) (noting that “desegregated schools improves the attitudes of both 
blacks and whites toward future interracial situations.”). 
 56. Boozer et al., supra note 49, at 305. 
 57. Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King’s Dream or Plessy’s 
Nightmare?, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY 21 (2004). 
 58. Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Why Segregation Matters: Poverty and 
Educational Inequality, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY 16–30 
(2005). 
 59. Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 54, at 751–83. 
  Both this social science research and a 
majority of today’s Court thus acknowledge racial integration as a 
compelling interest that states may proactively pursue. 
10
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II. MINNESOTA’S CHOICE-BASED INTEGRATION RULES 
A. Minnesota’s Commitment to Racially Integrated Schools 
Until the early 1990s, Minnesota explicitly recognized the 
benefits of integration and sought to address racial integration 
proactively in its schools.  Its State Board of Education had a strong 
record of advocating for policies that would eliminate racial 
separation of students.60  As early as 1967, the Board unanimously 
adopted a policy that recognized that “racial imbalance can be 
educationally harmful to both white and nonwhite children as it 
encourages prejudice and presents an inaccurate picture of life as 
pupils prepare to live and work in a multi-racial community, nation, 
and world.”61  Perhaps most significantly, a few years later,62 the 
Board adopted desegregation rules that sought to assist school 
districts in identifying and eliminating racial segregation in its 
schools.63  The Board recognized the value of “integrated 
education, sensitively conducted, in improving academic 
achievement of disadvantaged children, and in increasing mutual 
understanding among students from all backgrounds.”64
 Minnesota’s former desegregation rules required each 
school board to report the racial composition of its schools to the 
Commissioner of Education and to the extent any school’s minority 
population exceeded that of the district by 15%, to submit and 
implement a “comprehensive plan for the elimination of such 
segregation.”
 
65  The penalty for any district’s failure to comply with 
the rules was reduction of state aid.66
 
 60. EEO SECTION OF MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., DESEGREGATION POLICY ANALYSIS 
29–31 (1988). 
 61. Id. at App. A (attaching MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., POLICY ON RACIAL 
IMBALANCE AND DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967)). 
 62. During this same time in Minnesota history, the federal court began 
oversight of desegregation efforts in the Minneapolis School District as a result of 
class action litigation brought by the NAACP.  See Booker v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 
1, 351 F. Supp. 799 (D. Minn. 1972).  See also Cheryl W. Heilman, Booker v. Special 
School District No. 1: A History of School Desegregation in Minneapolis, Minnesota, 12 
LAW & INEQ. 127 (1993) (detailing the history of this desegregation case under 
which the court exercised jurisdiction for over ten years, from 1972 until 1983).  
 63. MINN. R. 3535.0300 (1973) (amended 1999). 
 64. Id. (quoting U.S. Senate Rep. of the Select Comm., 92nd Cong., on Equal 
Educational Opportunities).  In 1978, these rules were amended to specify that 
segregation occurred when the minority population in any school building 
exceeded that of the district by 15%.  MINN. R. 3535.0200, subp. 4 (1978). 
 65. MINN. R. 3535.0400 (1973) (amended 1999). 
  In any mandated 
 66. Id.  The rule authorized the Commissioner to approve a variance from 
11
Hobday et al.: A Missed Opportunity: Minnesota's Failed Experiment with Choice-b
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009
  
2009] CHOICE-BASED INTEGRATION IN EDUCATION 947 
desegregation plan, school boards were to use methods that were 
“educationally sound and administratively and economically 
feasible,” which could include “voluntary metropolitan or inter-
district cooperative plans.”67  The rules also explicitly required 
boards to consider the racial impact of new school construction or 
addition to existing buildings and prohibited the Commissioner 
from approving any plans that would “perpetuate or increase racial 
segregation.”68
B. Minnesota’s Current Rules 
 
Minnesota’s current rules state their commitment to racially 
integrated education69 but effectively end any affirmative obligation 
to prevent racial isolation in Minnesota’s schools.  They instead 
adopt a model that relies heavily on school choice.  
Contemporaneous media described the new rules as “end[ing] 
mandatory integration in Minnesota as long as districts could prove 
students had a choice of schools to attend beyond their 
neighborhood.”70  The rules proclaim that “the primary goal of 
public education is to enable all students to have opportunities to 
achieve academic success”71 and highlight that providing parents a 
choice in where their children attend school is “an important 
component of Minnesota’s education policy.”72  The rules only 
“encourage” districts to provide opportunities for students to attend 
racially balanced schools73 and “encourage adjoining districts to work 
cooperatively to improve cross-district integration.”74
 
the 15% standard, which could allow school buildings to exceed “50% minority 
enrollment” if school boards could “justify an educational reason” for the 
variance.  Id.  In determining whether the district’s rationale justified the variance, 
the State Board was to consider “whether other alternatives [were] educationally 
and economically available to the district such that the variance [was] not 
needed.”  MINN. R. 3535.0700 (1973) (amended 1999). 
 67. MINN. R. 3535.1000 (1973) (amended 1999). 
 68. MINN. R. 3535.1100 (1973) (amended 1999). 
 69. MINN. R. 3535.0100(B) (2007). 
 70. Paul Tosto, State Leaders Drafting New Plan for Desegregation in Schools, ST. 
PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 28, 1998, at A1. 
 71. MINN. R. 3535.0100(A) (2007). 
 72. Id. at .0100(D).  Cross-district efforts to improve integration are also 
supposed to provide parents and students “meaningful choices.”  Id. at .0100(H). 
 73. Id. at .0100(G) (emphasis added).  
 74. Id. at .0100(H) (emphasis added). 
  The rules 
acknowledge that many factors impact the ability of school districts 
to provide racially balanced schools, such as housing, jobs, and 
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transportation, but do not mandate the state do anything to 
address these other factors.75
In terms of proactively seeking to integrate public schools 
racially, the rules require very little of Minnesota school districts.  
The rules mandate a reporting mechanism for information about 
the racial composition of all schools.
 
76  A district’s report that 
indicates a “racially identifiable school”—defined as having an 
“enrollment of protected students” that is “more than 20 
percentage points above the enrollment of protected students in 
the entire district”77—triggers an investigation by the 
Commissioner as to whether such racially identifiable schools were 
“motivated at least in part by a discriminatory purpose.”78  In the 
course of this investigation, the district must submit additional 
information to the Commissioner.79  But it is only after a full 
investigation and a finding by the Commissioner that a school 
district has engaged in intentional segregation80 that the rules 
require the district to address the racial isolation in any school.81  
The rules thus set a high threshold for mandating any effort to 
address racial concentration.  In fact, notwithstanding the growing 
racial segregation in Minnesota schools, the Commissioner of 
Education has not found any district to have intentionally 
segregated its students under these current rules.82
The rules rely almost exclusively on voluntary mechanisms for 
addressing racial isolation.  The rules require districts with “racially 
identifiable schools” to develop plans that “provide options to help 
 
 
 75. Id. at .0100(C).  The rules also explicitly exempt certain public schools 
from the integration efforts, including charter schools, area learning centers, 
alternative programs, and treatment facilities.  MINN. R. 3535.0110, subp. 8 (2007). 
 76. MINN. R. 3535.0120 (2007). 
 77. MINN. R. 3535.0110, subp. 6 (2007). 
 78. MINN. R. 3535.0130 (2007). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id., subp. 1. 
 81. After a finding of intentional segregation, the school district must 
implement a plan to remedy such discrimination; failure to cooperate with the 
Commissioner in developing or implementing such a plan may result in reduction 
of state aid and other appropriate sanctions.  MINN. R. 3535.0150 (2007). 
 82. As of November 2005, Minnesota’s Office of the Legislative Auditor 
reported that the Minnesota Department of Education (“MDE”) had conducted 
only three in-depth reviews of school districts to determine whether intentional 
segregation exists, and that there were twelve districts at that time with racially 
identifiable schools that MDE should review.  OFFICE OF THE LEGIS. AUDITOR, STATE 
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integrate” the schools and to establish and work with community 
collaboration councils in doing so.83  The goal of such plans is 
“increased opportunities for interracial contact between 
students.”84  The rules require the Commissioner to evaluate such 
plans annually and report findings and recommendations to the 
legislature.85  The rules require racially isolated school districts to 
create multidistrict collaboration councils with adjoining districts to 
develop an integration plan.86  By statute, Minnesota also provides 
integration revenue to all districts that have a racially isolated 
school or that are themselves a racially isolated district.87  Yet, 
nowhere in the rules is the key term, “integration,” defined, and 
the rules define “racial balance” as “increased interaction of 
protected students and white students within schools and between 
districts,” without providing any specific criteria or measurable 
goal.88
C. Under the Rules, Minnesota Schools Resegregate 
 
Today, children of color in the Twin Cities are far more likely 
to attend a racially isolated school than they were ten years ago.  
The number of racially isolated schools in the Minneapolis/St. Paul 
metropolitan area has more than doubled since 2000, from twenty-
two to fifty.89  Today, students of color are more likely to attend a 
segregated school than they were in 1990.90
 
 83. MINN. R. 3535.0160 (2007).  The rules specifically exempt from this 
requirement any school that is racially identifiable because of a concentration of 
enrolled American Indian students that exists either because of special programs 
for such students or voluntary choices by such students or their parents.  Id., subp. 
1(B). 
 84. Id., subp. 3(A). 
 85. Id., subp. 4. 
 86. MINN. R. 3535.0170 (2007). 
 87. MINN. STAT. § 124D.86 (2007).  In addition to the failure of the rules 
themselves to effect positive change in Minnesota schools, the state’s provision of 
integration funding may, in fact, provide disincentives for districts to remedy racial 
imbalance because, except for three designated cities (Minneapolis, St. Paul, and 
Duluth), the additional funding depends on a finding of racial isolation in either a 
school or the district itself.  See INTEGRATION REVENUE, supra note 82, at 32. 
 88. MINN. R. 3535.0110, subp. 5 (2007). 
 89. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, RACIALLY IDENTIFIABLE SCHOOLS 
WITHIN A DISTRICT FOR 06–07 (2007); INTEGRATION REVENUE, supra note 82, at 24. 
  And these segregated, 
 90. Myron Orfield, Baris Gumus-Dawes, Thomas Luce & Geneva Finn, 
Neighborhood and School Segregation in the Twin Cities Region, in REGION: LAW, POLICY, 
AND THE FUTURE OF THE TWIN CITIES (Myron Orfield & Thomas Luce eds.) 
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 24, on file with authors).  The Institute on 
Race and Poverty defines non-white segregated schools as schools where the share 
14
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minority-dominated schools are poor schools.91  In the Twin Cities, 
the poverty rate at minority-segregated schools is two and a half 
times greater than the poverty rate of integrated schools and eight 
and a half times higher than the poverty rate at predominantly 
white schools.92
In 1992, before the state implemented its current rules, Twin 
Cities schools appeared to be integrating; a small core of schools in 
the central cities was segregated, but the inner-ring suburban 
schools were rapidly integrating.
 
93  By 2002, however, these 
integrated schools had become segregated.94  Families of color that 
moved to the suburbs to escape segregated, high-poverty, inner-city 
schools were now caught in segregated, high-poverty suburban 
schools.95  The resegregation of Twin Cities schools was the result 
of unstable integration, a situation where integration was only a 
stopping point on the path to segregation.96
If Minnesota had implemented the metro-wide plan proposed 
in 1995, it most likely would not have experienced this extreme 
 
 
of black, Hispanic, or Asian students exceeds 50%, or in schools with varying 
combinations of black, Hispanic, and Asian students, where the relative share of 
white students in the schools does not exceed 30%.  Id.  In predominantly white 
schools, the share of each non-white group is smaller than 10%.  Id. at 23.  Any 
school that is neither non-white segregated nor predominantly white is considered 
integrated.  Id.  In other cities, researchers have shown that this increasing racial 
isolation of students of color is not merely attributable to rising numbers of 
students of color but rather to school district policies in the wake of the 
termination of court oversight.  Charles T. Clotfelter et al., Federal Oversight, Local 
Control, and the Specter of “Resegregation” in Southern Schools, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
347 (2006). 
 91. Orfield et al., supra note 90. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 26–30. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. 
 96. The process of unstable school integration and resegregation occurred as 
follows: Schools start to resegregate at about the same time that they begin to look 
integrated, when the school has a student-of-color population of around 31–36%.  
Id. at 20.  When the student-of-color population reaches this threshold, white 
parents, steered away by realtor or personal perceptions that integrated schools 
are inferior, stop moving to the school’s attendance zone.  Id. at 25–27.  
Conversely, families of color are steered into integrated schools and 
neighborhoods.  Id. at 26.  This process leads to neighborhood segregation, which 
usually trails school segregation.  Id. at 25–27.  While resegregating schools are not 
usually high-poverty schools, once the schools are segregated, the schools become 
high-poverty as the parents with the means to leave the school do so.  Id. at 25.  
Once schools become identifiably segregated, high-poverty schools, reintegration 
is extremely difficult, as parents are reluctant to send their children to segregated 
high-poverty schools when alternatives exist.  Id. at 26. 
15
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resegregation.  Other states that implemented metro-wide school 
desegregation plans did not experience neighborhood or school 
resegregation to the same degree as the Twin Cities.97  For 
example, when the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district, a metro-
wide district in North Carolina, had a court-ordered desegregation 
plan, neighborhoods across the county remained relatively 
integrated.98  When the school district ended its court-ordered 
desegregation plan and moved to a neighborhood school model, 
neighborhoods rapidly resegregated.99  The logic behind metro-
wide, mandatory plans is that families cannot easily avoid attending 
integrated schools by purchasing homes in white-segregated 
neighborhoods.  No matter where families find housing, students 
will attend integrated schools.  Minnesota’s rules, however, 
encourage piecemeal, voluntary integration plans, which have 
allowed realtors and families to steer clear of integrated schools.  
The result has been rapid school segregation in inner-ring suburbs, 
greater racial and economic segregation for children of color, and 
reduced life opportunities for a large part of the Twin Cities 
population.100
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MINNESOTA’S CHOICE-BASED RULES 
Until 1995, it appeared that Minnesota would continue its 
commitment to mandatory desegregation and adopt rules that 
would both mandate metro-wide desegregation and penalize 
noncompliant districts.  A brief history of the current rules reveals 
that at this pivotal point in time, Minnesota chose a different path.  
In the face of great political opposition to the proposed rules, 
Minnesota instead opted for rules that were heavy in reporting 
mechanisms and light on any real mandates or effective remedies.  
And it did so claiming that the law required such an approach.  In 
hindsight, these rules were neither legally required nor effective in 
preventing racially isolated schools. 
 
 
 97. Id. at 12. 
 98. Brief for Swann Fellowship as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
 99. JEFFREY M. WEINSTEIN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCHOOL 
CHARACTERISTICS AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS: EVIDENCE FROM SCHOOL 
REDISTRICTING 23 (Job Market Paper, Nov. 11, 2007), available at 
http://econweb.tamu.edu/Job%20Candidates/2008/Papers/Weinstein.pdf. 
 100. Orfield et al., supra note 90, at 7–11. 
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A. Minnesota Seeks to Address Growing Racial Isolation in Its Schools 
In 1988, the Minnesota Department of Education concluded 
that although the original rules were effectively desegregating the 
schools, its numerical definition of segregation was becoming 
unworkable, particularly in districts such as Minneapolis and St. 
Paul where the minority population had increased significantly.101  
In addition, by the 1990s, families of color were moving from the 
central cities to the suburbs and suburban schools were beginning 
to integrate.102  State officials feared that this integration would be 
unstable and lead to minority-segregated schools in the same way 
city schools had segregated ten and twenty years earlier.103  In light 
of these phenomena, the Department recommended that the State 
Board of Education provide leadership in promoting racial 
integration across the state.104
For over two years, the Board actively pursued this work, 
holding public meetings on the need for new desegregation rules 




 101. Specifically, in Minneapolis, the minority-student population grew from 
24.4% in 1978, when the rule was adopted, to 50% in 1989.  STATE OF MINNESOTA 
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, FAMILIES, & LEARNING, STATEMENT OF NEED AND 
REASONABLENESS IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSED RULES RELATING TO 
DESEGREGATION: MINNESOTA RULES CHAPTER 3535 (3535.0100 TO 3535.0180) 8–9 
(Nov. 1998) [hereinafter SONAR].  Similarly, the St. Paul School District’s 
minority enrollment increased from 22% to 42% in the same time period.  Id.  As 
of 1997, the state argued that to qualify as a “segregated” school under the old 
rules, a school in Minneapolis would have had to be over 82% protected students.  
Id.  And, with the 30% variance, it could have had more than 97% students of 
color and still be in compliance.  Id. at 9. 
 102. See generally STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION DESEGREGATION/INTEGRATION 
RECOMMENDATIONS (May 14, 1991) [hereinafter INTEGRATION RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
 103. Id.  See also Memorandum from Donald Hadfield, Educ. Specialist, Equal 
Educ. Opportunities to Robert Wedl, Deputy Comm’r, Minn. Dep’t of Educ. (Oct. 
14, 1988) (on file with authors) (expressing school districts’ fears that existing 
rules would not lead to stably integrated schools). 
 104. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY SECTION OF MINN. DEPT. OF EDUC., DESEGREGATION 
POLICY ANALYSIS 39–41, 49 (Jan. 19, 1988).  The Department’s report emphasized 
the societal benefits of racially integrated education for all students in preparing 
them “as citizens to live and function productively in a pluralistic society.”  Id. at 
7–8.  And it acknowledged the state’s obligation to remedy not only subjectively 
intentional separation of students by race, but also such segregation that was a 
“natural and foreseeable consequence” of state policy.  Id. at 15. 
 105. SONAR, supra note 101, at 8–9. 
  In May 1991, the State Board 
recommended, among other things, that metro-wide desegregation 
be pursued by declaring the seven-county metropolitan area a 
special government area for school integration purposes and that 
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the Governor should convene a task force to address segregation at 
the state level in the areas of planning, housing, education, 
transportation, and civil rights.106  In 1992, the State Board drafted 
new rules that, notably, defined desegregation and segregation as 
“intentional or unintentional” racial separation of students or staff 
within schools and districts and required all schools within the 
seven-county metropolitan area to consult with Minneapolis and St. 
Paul in developing their integration plans.107
 B. Roundtable Discussion Group Began Working on Mandatory 
Desegregation Rules 
 
In 1993, the legislature became involved in the desegregation 
rulemaking efforts.  Responding to the State Board’s work, the 
legislature specifically directed the Board to convene meetings to 
address the proposed rule changes.108  In mid-1993, the Board 
quickly assembled what became known as the “Roundtable 
Discussion Group,” whose membership list reflected the broad-
based participation that the legislature mandated.109
In February 1994, the Roundtable Discussion Group submitted 
a final report to the State Board, which proposed new 
desegregation rules
 
110 that reaffirmed Brown’s holding “that racially 
segregated schools are inherently unequal”111
 
 106. INTEGRATION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 102, at 5. 
 107. MINN. R. 3535.0300, subps. 3, 6 (Feb. 2, 1992 Draft) (amended 1999) 
(emphasis added). 
 108. 1993 Minn. Laws 1174. 
 109. The report includes a list of roughly fifty individuals, representing 
organizations including the NAACP, the PTA, St. Paul and Minneapolis School 
Districts, the School Boards Association, the Urban League, the Urban Coalition, 
and the Asian-Pacific Coalition, who participated in the discussions.  ROUNDTABLE 
DISCUSSION GROUP ON DESEGREGATION/INTEGRATION AND INCLUSIVE EDUCATION 
FINAL REPORT TO: STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND STATE LEGISLATURE, i and App. A 
(Feb. 1994) [hereinafter ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994)]. 
 110. The work of the Roundtable Discussion Group included both proposed 
rules relating to desegregation, or the student population at specific school sites, 
and what later became known as the “education diversity rule,” rules relating to 
closing the achievement gap between students of color and white students.  After 
1995, the State Board separated the diversity rule from the desegregation rule and 
ultimately abandoned it altogether.  This article is concerned primarily with the 
history and application of the desegregation rules.  For more information about 
the diversity rule and its demise, see Stout & Stevens, supra note 12, at 341. 
 111. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 and stated, 
“segregation in schools prevents equal educational opportunity and 
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leads to segregation in the broader society.”112  The rules called for 
intra-governmental responsibility in promoting desegregation,113 
metro-wide school integration,114 measurable and results-oriented 
desegregation plans,115 and strong penalties for noncompliance.116
These proposals present the state policymakers, including 
the state board, commissioner, governor and legislature, 
an opportunity to provide strong and creative leadership 
in addressing one of the critical issues of this decade. . . . 
  
Describing the Roundtable’s report, the then-President of the 
Board stated: 
 
 112. ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109, at ii–iii (reaffirming 
the decision in Brown v. Board of Education as a basic tenet and driving force 
behind the Roundtable recommendations); ROUNDTABLE’S DRAFT RULE 3535.0200 
(Jan. 10, 1994) App. D to the ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109. 
 113. The rules, recognizing that school districts alone cannot effect 
desegregation, looked to other governmental authorities for assistance in creating 
housing, employment, and transportation policies that support school 
desegregation.  ROUNDTABLE’S DRAFT RULE 3535.0200 (Jan. 10, 1994) App. D to 
the ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109. 
 114. The draft rules defined the “metropolitan area” to include school districts 
from seven counties and used the percentage of learners of color in this metro-
wide area as the comparison to determine whether a particular district within the 
metro area was segregated.  ROUNDTABLE’S DRAFT RULE 3535.0300, subps. 5, 11 
(Jan. 10, 1994) App. D to the ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109.  
The rules, which defined “segregation” as “intentional or unintentional separation 
of learners of color or staff of color within a building or school district,” 
considered segregated those school districts that have 15% or more learners of 
color than the metro-wide percentage.  Id., subp. 11(A) & (B).  The rules also 
defined segregation in the context of particular schools within a district, but based 
those on comparisons between the schools and their district-wide average.  Id., 
subp. 11(C).  The rules also considered segregated to be those districts that have 
fewer than 10% learners of color or less than half of the percentage of metro-wide 
learners of color, whichever was larger.  Id. 
 115. The draft rules included specific desegregation goals and strategies, both 
inter- and intra-district, and practices relating to staffing, as well as building and 
remodeling programs.   ROUNDTABLE’S DRAFT RULE 3535.0400, subp. 2 (Jan. 10, 
1994) App. D to the ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109. 
 116. Districts that did not comply with the rules were given limited time and 
assistance to do so, after which time the district would lose state aid.  
ROUNDTABLE’S DRAFT RULE 3535.0900 (Jan. 10, 1994) App. D to the ROUNDTABLE 
DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109.  The rules also gave the Commissioner 
authority to order schools to be reconstituted that fail to meet their educational 
goals within three years.  Id.  Prospectively, the rules mandated local school boards 
to consider and “give maximum effect to” preventing and eliminating both racial 
and socioeconomic segregation in schools, and stated that the Commissioner 
would not approve plans for additions to schools or new construction “when such 
approval will perpetuate or increase racial segregation.”  ROUNDTABLE’S DRAFT 
RULE 3535.1000 (Jan. 10, 1994) App. D to the ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 
1994), supra note 109. 
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Now is the time for state policymakers to provide strong 
and proactive leadership.  The window of opportunity is 
closing quickly—if nothing is done, we face a very serious 
threat of major litigation, which may result in costly and 
prescriptive solutions ordered by the courts.117
The legislature endorsed the Roundtable’s rules by giving the 
Board authority to implement them.
 
118
C. State Rules Take a Sharp Turn 
 
In 1995, the direction of Minnesota’s desegregation rules 
changed dramatically.  Early opposition to the Board’s work came 
from the Department of Education.  For example, in December 
1994, the then-Assistant Commissioner advocated for a voluntary 
approach to inter-district integration that would use incentives 
rather than mandates.119  In January 1995, the Department 
recommended that the new desegregation rules should focus on 
improving learning for all students and provide racial balance 
through voluntary parent choice.120  It further recommended 
eliminating both the penalty of reconstituting noncompliant 
schools and the requirement that the Commissioner consider 
desegregation when approving new school sites, arguing that 
neither was legally permissible.121
 
 117. Memorandum from John Plocker, President, Minn. State Bd. of Educ. to 
Sen. Larry Pogemiller, Chair, Senate Educ. Comm., Rep. Lyndon Carlson Chair, 
House Educ. Comm. and Rep. Kathleen Vallenga, Chair, House Educ. Fin. Div. 
(Feb. 17, 1994) (on file with authors). 
 118. 1994 Minn. Laws 2628–29, ch. 647, art. 8, § 1.  At the same time, the 
legislature established an Office of Desegregation/Integration in the Department 
of Education and mandated the Commissioner to coordinate the office activities 
and create an advisory board of eight superintendents and a representative from 
each of the same four councils specified in the creation of the Roundtable 
Discussion Group.  Id. § 2, subdivs. 1–3. 
 119. Memorandum from Robert J. Wedl, Assistant Comm’r, 
Desegregation/Integration in Minn. to Members of the Roundtable Discussion 
Group, at ¶ 2–3 (Dec. 15, 1994). 
 120. Memorandum from Robert J. Wedl, Assistant Comm’r, Proposed 
Desegregation/Integration Learning Policy to Members of the State Bd. of Educ. 
(Jan. 10, 1995). 
 
 121. Memorandum from Robert J. Wedl, Assistant Comm’r, 
Desegregation/Integration in Minn. to Members of the Roundtable Discussion 
Group (Dec. 15, 1994).  In February 1995, the State Board adopted a preliminary 
draft of the rules still based largely on the work of the Roundtable Discussion 
Group and presented them to the House Education Committee.  REVISED 
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION GROUP 3 (Feb. 13, 1995).  
The local newspaper described the Board’s action as taking “another step down 
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In March of 1995, the Center of the American Experiment122 
published a 115-page monograph by Katherine Kersten that 
challenged the benefit of racial balance in schools and highlighted 
the costs associated with such plans.123  Kersten argued both that 
the State was not legally obligated to enact the proposed proactive 
desegregation rules, and that in doing so, the State would expose 
itself to greater liability in any future litigation because the rules 
would impose higher legal standards than courts were imposing in 
desegregation litigation.124
The House Republican Task Force on Student Achievement 
and Integration also formally responded to the proposed rules, 




the road to equality.”  Paul Drew Duchesne, State Board of Education’s Latest 
Desegregation Plan Is on the Table, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 24 1995, at 2B.  
Notably, this version of the rules included in the policy section that the State and 
local boards would seek ways to collaborate with other authorities dealing with 
housing, jobs, planning, and transportation.  REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE 
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION GROUP 3 (Feb. 13, 1995). 
 122. At the time, the Center of the American Experiment was a relatively new 
presence in Minnesota.  Center of the American Experiment, About Us, 
http://www.americanexperiment.org/about (last visited Mar. 20, 2009) (citing 
1990 as the date of the Center’s inception).  With support from the corporate 
community and several moderate Democrats, the Center was part of a network of 
conservative institutions associated with the Heritage Foundation.  Id. 
 123. KATHERINE A. KERSTEN, CENTER OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT, GOOD 
INTENTIONS ARE NOT ENOUGH: THE PERIL IMPOSED BY MINNESOTA’S NEW 
DESEGREGATION PLAN (1995) [hereinafter KERSTEN, GOOD INTENTIONS]. 
 124. Id. at 3.  Before Minnesota implemented its new rules, the Minneapolis 
NAACP initiated litigation on behalf of children enrolled in the Minneapolis 
public schools.  Complaint, NAACP v. State, No. 95-14800 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1995).  
In state court, plaintiffs alleged that the State had not taken effective action to 
desegregate the schools and that it reinforced racial and economic inequality 
through its school-construction policies.  Id.  The lawsuit contended that the 
resulting segregated education violated the Minnesota State Constitution’s 
education and equal protection clauses.  Id.  The litigation was, in large part, 
modeled after the ongoing litigation in Connecticut, Sheff v. O’Neil, which similarly 
alleged a violation of the state’s constitution in providing inadequate education to 
low-income, minority students.  678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).  For further 
discussion of Sheff and its relevance to Minnesota’s rules, see infra notes 150–53 
and accompanying text. 
 125. HOUSE REPUBLICAN REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 
& INTEGRATION, BRIDGING GAPS & BREAKING BARRIERS: A MINNESOTA MODEL FOR 
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT & INTEGRATION (Nov. 1995) [hereinafter TASK FORCE 
REPORT].  Both the Task Force Report and the Kersten monograph rely heavily on 
the work of David Armor in his 1995 book, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the 
Law, in questioning the educational benefits of school desegregation.  Kersten 
specifically noted that in June 1994, David Armor spoke in the Twin Cities with 
legislators, school superintendents, and members of the State Board of Education.  
KERSTEN, GOOD INTENTIONS, supra note 123, at 8. 
  The task force questioned 
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the Roundtable’s objectivity, arguing that it failed to consider the 
negative consequences of mandatory school integration plans and 
questioning its selection of national consultants.126  The task force 
also strongly opposed the use of any penalties against 
nonconforming schools and called the reconstitution penalty a 
“draconian measure that has never worked.”127
The public controversy over the rules coincided with the 
reelection of the Republican Governor, who appeared influenced 
by the strong opposition to the rules coming from his party.
 
128  
During the last half of the Governor’s second term, the controversy 
surrounding the Board’s policy initiatives grew even stronger.  This 
time, the public response was to a related, but then distinct, set of 
proposed rules known as the “diversity rules.”  Again, Kersten 
attacked the Board’s work, this time in her biweekly newspaper 
column.129
 
 126. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 125, at 5.  In particular, the task force was 
concerned that the Minneapolis school system had retained Hogan & Hartson 
(former law firm of roundtable consultant David Tatel) to advise it on the merits 
of filing a lawsuit against the state.  Id. at 2.  The task force recommended that the 
State Board suspend the rulemaking process until it “obtains a great deal more 
information from a broader array of experts” and that it consider the impact that 
any changes to the present rule will have in providing a basis for or even 
expanding state liability in lawsuits like the one brought by the Minneapolis 
NAACP.  Id. at 5–6.  The task force criticized the use of mandatory inter-district 
efforts as “a remedy more sweeping than one that could ever be imposed by a 
federal court” and argued that the rules should not use racial percentages or 
enrollment quotas.  Id. at 6.  The task force opposed the use of integration 
councils as usurping the role of local school boards and the collection and 
reporting of racial and ethnic data as “repugnant.”  Id. at 7–8. 
 127. Id. at 8.  Ironically, these are the very measures employed by the federal 
No Child Left Behind Act for high-poverty schools receiving Title I funding that 
do not achieve adequate yearly progress.  See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107–110, § 1116, 115 Stat. 1425, 1479–87 (2002). 
 128. Stout & Stevens, supra note 12, at 349–50. 
 129. Kersten characterized the rules as the State Board of Education’s “brave 
new multicultural world,” that requires schools to teach “‘communication skills to 
enable cross-cultural and inter-ethnic group interaction’ of the kind that works so 
well in Beirut.”  Katherine Kersten, State School Board’s Dubious Diversity Rules: Unless 
Citizens Object Soon, There Won’t Be a Public Hearing, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 
15, 1997, at 17A [hereinafter Kersten, Dubious Diversity].  Kersten claimed that the 
rules would do little to assist Minnesota’s poor, minority students and would 
instead put “numbers-juggling ahead of kids’ needs.”  Id.  She said that the rules 
would actually hamper academic progress and that the “sprawling, politicized 
curriculum” would “leave little time” for reading, writing, and arithmetic.  Id.  For 
a discussion of Kersten’s article and its impact on the rules and the State Board, 
see Stout & Stevens, supra note 12, at 346. 
  She called for a public response, which came quickly 
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss3/2
  
958 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3 
and forcefully.130  The article “sparked a maelstrom of bluster on 
talk radio, and hundreds of calls and letters concerning the 
proposed rule—including two death threats—poured into the 
department of Children, Families, and Learning.”131  The then-
Board President drafted a response to Kersten’s article, but was 
instructed by the Governor not to release it.132  After initial public 
hearings on the rule, the Governor asked the Board to stop 
implementation because “the proposed rule [was] not in the best 
interest of Minnesota children.”133  Although the Board initially 
voted against withdrawing the rules, two members’ terms then 
expired.  The Governor chose to appoint two new members, which 
shifted the balance of power, and the Board withdrew the diversity 
rules.134  Shortly thereafter, the Minnesota legislature abolished its 
State Board of Education,135 joining Wisconsin as the only state 
without such a policy-setting entity.136
D. State Attorney General Advises No Compelling Interest in K-12 
Diversity 
 
 With this political backdrop and during the ongoing 
controversy over the diversity rules, the desegregation rules 
transformed dramatically under the direction of the Office of the 
State Attorney General from 1995 until they were passed in 1999.137
 
 130. See Kersten, Dubious Diversity, supra note 129. 
 131. Stout & Stevens, supra note 12, at 346. 
 132. Id.  At the time of the controversy surrounding the diversity rules, the 
Governor-appointed Board President simultaneously served as the Commissioner 
of Human Rights, a position she held “at the pleasure of the Governor.”  Id. at 
349.  The Board President followed the Governor’s directions and did not publicly 
respond to Kersten’s attack of the Board’s work.  Id. 
 133. Id. at 346. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 341, 347. 
 136. Minnesota and Wisconsin continue to be the only two states without a 
board of education.  Michele McNeil, Authority Gradually Eroding Stature of State 
Boards, EDUC. WK., Mar. 18, 2008.  In 2003, New Mexico essentially followed 
Minnesota’s example by stripping its board of authority and making it advisory-
only.  Id.  Nationwide, there has been a recent trend of eroding school boards’ 
power “as lawmakers and governors seek to expand their authority over K-12 
education and, in some cases, reverse education policy set in motion by elected or 
appointed boards.”  Id. 
 137. See SONAR, supra note 101, at 4.  Although the Board had been working 
on drafts of these rules for many years, it was not until it formally began the 
rulemaking process that it consulted with the attorney general’s office.  See id. 
(discussing the review of the rules by the attorney general’s office). 
  
The Assistant Attorney General’s legal advice influenced the 
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direction of the new desegregation rules in at least two significant 
ways: 1) limiting the definition of “segregation” to include only 
racial imbalance caused by intentional discrimination, and 2) 
relying heavily on voluntary integration efforts by districts, schools, 
and parents.  Both of these changes were premised on the Attorney 
General’s legal opinion that state action affirmatively requiring 
racial balance in schools without a showing of intentional 
discrimination would not survive an equal protection challenge.138  
The Statement of Need and Reasonableness (“SONAR”), the legal 
argument drafted in support of the new rules for the administrative 
hearings, concluded that diversity in K-12 education would not be 
considered a compelling interest under a strict-scrutiny analysis.139
Based on the state’s analysis, the new rules limit the definition 
of segregation to only racial separation caused by a discriminatory 
purpose.
 
140  The state’s legal analysis rejected the Roundtable 
Draft’s invocation of Brown and its legacy as an underlying rationale 
for the new rules.141  Brown’s holding was then limited to its facts: 
the state only has an affirmative duty to correct “government-
imposed, intentional segregation of students based on their race,” 
not racial imbalance.142  The state argued that because it was an 
open question whether racial diversity in K-12 schools constituted a 
“compelling interest,” any affirmative, race-conscious policy in this 
context would likely not withstand strict-scrutiny.143
 
 138. See id. at 12–18. 
 139. Id. at 5–8, 12–21.  Ironically, the legal challenge the state was facing at the 
time did not challenge the constitutionality of the state’s affirmative policies, 
which had been in place since the late 1970s, but rather the state’s failure to 
adequately address racial segregation under the state constitution.  See Complaint, 
NAACP v. State, No. 95-14800 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1995).  Nonetheless, the state 
seemed most concerned about an equal protection challenge brought by parents 
or students alleging “reverse discrimination.”  SONAR, supra note 101, at 19 (“The 
concern with using racial quotas is not only that lawsuits will be brought, but more 
importantly that it is highly doubtful that such suits can be won.”). 
 140. The state interpreted the case law as “call[ing] into serious question 
whether it is permissible to have a rule which requires or even encourages race-
based student assignments . . . absent a finding of intentional discrimination.”  
SONAR, supra note 101, at 14. 
 141. Id. at B1 (“Brown v. Board of Education did not stand for the proposition 
that racially segregated schools, without more, are inherently unequal.”). 
 142. Id. at 13. 
 143. Id. at 13–18. 
  For its 
conclusion that the state should not mandate districts or schools to 
consider race proactively, the state could not rely on any Eighth 
Circuit or United States Supreme Court decision because the issue 
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had not been decided.  It was not until Parents Involved that the 
Supreme Court addressed this issue.144  Thus, attempting to predict 
what the Supreme Court would decide regarding whether states 
have a compelling interest in addressing racial isolation in K-12 
education, Minnesota summarized the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke145 on diversity in higher 
education and its decisions on affirmative-action policies in other 
government contexts.146  It also highlighted opinions from several 
circuit courts that it characterized as “severely limiting the use of 
race-based measures in several different contexts”147 and cited to 
several other then-recent decisions that held that the use of racial 
quotas to maintain racial balance in the K-12 setting, absent a 
remedial obligation, “will not likely be constitutional.”148
  In its constitutional analysis, the state did not effectively 
incorporate the Minnesota Supreme Court’s recent holding that 
education is a fundamental right under the Minnesota 
Constitution.
 
149  This holding should significantly alter the equal 
protection analysis under the state constitution.  A then-recent and 
prominent decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court, Sheff v. 
O’Neill, illustrates this analysis under a state constitutional 
fundamental right to education similar to Minnesota’s fundamental 
right to education.150
 
 144. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 
2738 (2007). 
 145. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).   
 146. SONAR, supra note 101, at 14 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (1978)).  The SONAR also cites to several affirmative action cases in 
the employment context.  Id. at 14–15 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 
U.S. 267, 283–84 (1986); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 
(1989)). 
 147. Id. at 15–16 (citing Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); 
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994); Coal. for Econ. Equity v. 
Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 
111 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 1997); Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 
(3d Cir. 1996)). 
 148. Id. at 18–20 (citing Equal Open Enrollment Ass’n v. Akron Bd. of Educ., 
937 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Ohio 1996); Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 
1998); and other contemporaneous litigation and settlements relating to this 
issue)). 
 149. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993) (“Thus . . . we hold 
that education is a fundamental right under the state constitution . . . .”). 
 150. 678 A.2d 1267, 1282 (Conn. 1996). 
  In Sheff, the court relied on the fundamental 
right to education under its state constitution to conclude that it 
had an affirmative obligation to address the racial and ethnic 
isolation in the Hartford public schools even when an intentional 
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state action did not cause such isolation.151  The Sheff decision was 
not without its critics,152 but Minnesota’s failure to address this 
analysis seems problematic, especially at a time when there was 
ongoing litigation against the state that had Sheff-like allegations.153
 Even assuming the state’s conclusion that it could not 
proactively address racial isolation without a finding of intentional 
discrimination was correct, the standard it set for doing so was so 
high that it effectively prevented the Department of Education 
from making this determination.
 
154  Before any mandated 
integration, the Commissioner must find that racial imbalance in 
the schools “results from acts motivated at least in part by a 
discriminatory purpose.”155  Three of the five factors the 
Commissioner must consider during this inquiry require a showing 
of “discriminatory purpose.”156
 
 151. Id.  The court also proclaimed that, consistent with public policy, the 
state’s constitutional responsibility “encompasses responsibility for segregation to 
which the legislature has contributed, even unintentionally.”  Id. at 1285.  
 152. In fact, one of the experts Minnesota relied upon in the administrative 
hearings on the proposed desegregation rules, Christine Rossell, soundly criticized 
the Connecticut Supreme Court’s holding.  Christine H. Rossell, An Analysis of the 
Court Decisions in Sheff v. O’Neill and Possible Remedies for Racial Isolation, 29 CONN. 
L. REV. 1187, 1200 (1997) (arguing that “any individual or state agency could 
bring suit in federal district court and have the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 
finding reversed . . . .  [This is because] a race based remedy would not be allowed 
in a situation where there has been no intentional racial violation.”). 
 153. See Xiong v. State, 195 F.3d 424 (8th Cir. 1999); NAACP v. Metro. 
Council, 125 F.3d 1171 (8th Cir. 1997), vacated, 522 U.S. 1145 (1998), aff’d on 
reh’g, 144 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 826 (1998). 
 154. The SONAR even predicted that “the finding of intentional segregation 
would be very rare, since in the past 25 years, no such findings have been made by 
the Commissioner.”  SONAR, supra note 101, at A13. 
 155. MINN. R. 3535.0130, subp. 1 (2007). 
 156. The first three factors are:  
A. the historical background of the acts which led to the racial 
composition of the school, including whether the acts reveal a series of 
official actions taken for discriminatory purposes; 
 
B. whether the specific sequence of events resulting in the school’s racial 
composition reveals a discriminatory purpose; [and] 
 
C. departures from the normal substantive or procedural sequence of 
decision making, as evidenced, for example, by the legislative or 
administrative history of the acts in question, especially if there are 
contemporary statements by district officials, or minutes or reports of 
meetings that demonstrate a discriminatory purpose. 
MINN. R. 3535.0130, subp. 1(A)–(C) (2007). 
  The rule mandates that the two 
other factors, which consider the impact of official decisions rather 
than their underlying motives, cannot alone support a finding of 
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discriminatory purpose.157  In support of this standard, the state 
cites to United States Supreme Court decisions that review the type 
of harm that federal courts must find before ordering a state to 
remedy a constitutional violation.158
Eighth Circuit law recognized a much broader definition of 
intentional discrimination than the Minnesota rules do.  In United 
States v. School District of Omaha, the Eighth Circuit announced a 
presumption of an intent to segregate when “school authorities have 
engaged in acts or omissions, the natural, probable and foreseeable 
consequence of which is to bring about or maintain segregation.”
 
159
     Speaking in [d]e jure terms does not require us, then, 
to limit the state activity which effectively spells 
segregation only to acts which are provably motivated by a 
desire to discriminate.  Aside from the difficulties of 
  
Quoting from the Second Circuit, which recognized a similar 
presumption, the court explained the underlying rationale for the 
rule: 
     To say that the foreseeable must be shown to have 
been actually foreseen would invite a standard almost 
impossible of proof save by admissions.  When we 
consider the motivation of people constituting a school 
board, the task would be even harder, for we are dealing 
with a collective will.  It is difficult enough to find the 
collective mind of a group of legislators.  It is even harder 
to find the motivation of local citizens, many of whom 
would be as reluctant to admit that they have racial 
prejudice as to admit that they have no sense of humor. 
 
 
 157. Id., subp. 1.  These two factors are: 
D. whether the racial composition of the school is the result of acts which 
disadvantage one race more than another, as evidenced, for example, 
when protected students are bused further or more frequently than 
White students; and 
 
E. whether the racially identifiable composition of the school was 
predictable given the policies or practices of the district. 
 Id., subp. 1(D)–(E). 
 158. SONAR, supra note 101, at 36–37 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1997); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 
449 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). 
 159. U.S. v. Sch. Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 535–36 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975).  The court acknowledged that two other circuits 
recognized a similar presumption.  Id. at 536 (citing Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of 
Educ., N.Y. Sch. Dist. No. 21, 512 F.2d 37, 50–51 (2d Cir. 1975); Oliver v. Mich. 
State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974)). 
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ferreting out a collective motive and conversely the 
injustice of ascribing collective will to articulate remarks 
of particular bigots, the nature of the “state action” takes 
it quality from its foreseeable effect.160
The Omaha decision arose in a context particularly relevant to 
Minnesota—it was a school desegregation case in a northern state 
that had never engaged in slavery or had state-mandated 
segregation.  The court still found intentional discrimination based 
on the foreseeable effects of the state’s decisions.
 
161
Ultimately, Minnesota adopted the rules in 1999.
  Minnesota’s 
explanation for its definition of intentional segregation ignored 
Omaha altogether. 
162  In the 
process, it drew national attention on the question of choice-based 
integration.  Opponents of mandatory racial integration rules 
looked to the work of David Armor and Christine Rossell in 
support of their claims that integrated education does not lead to 
improved academic achievement163
 
 160. Id. (quoting Hart, 512 F.2d at 50 (citations omitted)). 
 161. Id. at 537.  In light of Supreme Court developments, including Arlington 
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. 
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the 
Eighth Circuit twice reconsidered the Omaha decision.  Both times it affirmed its 
finding of intentional segregation based on the foreseeable effects of the state 
action.  See U.S. v. Sch. Dist. of Omaha, 565 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1977) (Omaha III) 
(en banc, per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978); U.S. v. Sch. Dist. of 
Omaha, 541 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1976) (Omaha II). 
 162. The following sections were added or altered in 1999: MINN. R. 3535.0100, 
3535.0130, 3535.0150, 3535.0160, and 3535.0170.  See 24 Minn. Reg. 77–78 (July 6, 
1999). 
 and that mandatory integration 
 163. Armor visited Minnesota in June 1994 to give an address at a Center of 
the American Experiment Luncheon Forum and speak at a roundtable with 
legislators, school superintendents, and members of the State Board of Education.  
KERSTEN, GOOD INTENTIONS, supra note 123, at 8.  Kersten claims that Armor’s visit 
“first alerted many Minnesotans to the shortcomings of the . . . failure of race-
based busing as a vehicle for improving minority academic performance.”  Id. at 9 
(discussed in the author’s Acknowledgments).  Kersten relies extensively on his 
then-forthcoming book, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law, in her 
critique of the Roundtable’s work.  Id. at 5 (discussing Armor’s review of social 
science research as casting “serious doubt on whether busing actually produces 
significant gains for minority children.”).  These same experts were cited as part of 
the most recent Supreme Court debate, at least in the back-and-forth between 
Justices Thomas and Breyer in their Parents Involved opinions.  Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2777–78 (2007) (Thomas, J. 
concurring); id. at 2821 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Thomas notes the scholarly 
debate about the educational benefits of racial balancing and cites to Armor and 
Rossell’s work as an example of some who conclude that there are “no 
demonstrable educational benefits.”  Id. at 2776 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 
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does not work.164  Gary Orfield served both as a consultant to the 
Roundtable165 and later testified against the proposed rules, 
predicting that they would take “huge steps backward” in 
Minnesota’s efforts to desegregate its schools.166
IV. MINNESOTA’S RULES PERMIT SEGREGATIVE SCHOOL 
ATTENDANCE DECISIONS 
 
Minnesota’s decision to implement the current rules has had 
very real consequences for its schools.  The rules, while certainly 
permitting districts to make pro-integrative decisions, do not 
mandate or even affirmatively support such decision-making.  They 
also do not explicitly prohibit districts from making decisions about 
school attendance boundaries or school closings that, in effect, 
 
Armor & Rossell, Desegregation and Resegregation in the Public Schools, in BEYOND THE 
COLOR LINE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 239, 251 (A. 
Thernstrom & S. Thernstrom eds. 2002)).  Breyer cites to Armor’s Forced Justice as 
a counter-example to the studies that find a positive correlation.  Id. at 2821 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 164. The SONAR relies on Rossell’s and Armor’s combined work to support 
adopting a voluntary approach.  SONAR, supra note 101, at 54 (citing Christine 
Rossell and David Armor, The Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans, 1968–1991, 
24 AM. POL. Q. 267 (1996)).  The SONAR also cites to Rossell and other social 
scientists for the opinion that “massive bussing and similar mandatory forms of 
desegregation can lead to significant white flight, which lessens the opportunity to 
maximize the benefits associated with desegregation.”  Id. at 6 n.5.  Rossell served 
as a consultant to the state agency and testified at the administrative hearing in 
support of Minnesota’s new rules.  Testimony of Christine Rossell, Hearing 
Transcript In re Proposed Adoption of Rules Relating to Desegregation 50–59 (Jan. 20, 
1999) (on file with the Minn. Dep’t of Educ.).  Rossell testified that the rules’ 
reliance on voluntary techniques “are more likely to achieve greater, and 
ultimately more lasting, school integration than the previous rule was able to 
obtain.”  Id. at 52. 
 165. ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109. 
 166. In the Matter of the Proposed Adoption of Rules Relating to Desegregation: 
Hearings Before the State of Minn. Dep’t of Children, Families and Learning, 145 (1999) 
(testimony of Gary Orfield) (on file with authors).  Orfield describes the rules as 
“Swiss cheese of obfuscation that really [have] no goals, that have no means of 
getting there, no resources, and . . . ludicrous definitions of desegregation and a 
shift from looking at segregation as a problem per se to looking at only provable 
intentional segregation [as] something that can be regulated.”  Id.  In particular, 
he critiqued the rules’ definition of segregation because of its reliance on district 
and adjacent district populations, as opposed to the metropolitan-wide school 
populations, as the relative comparison.  Id. at 145–46, 150.  He further critiqued 
Minnesota’s requirement of a finding of intentional discrimination before 
triggering any kind of mandatory action and predicted that “there’s unlikely to be 
any kind of action since it requires large resources to prove intent in the school 
segregation context.”  Id. at 146–47. 
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create racially isolated schools.  Instead, Minnesota’s rules leave the 
desegregation of racially isolated schools up to the will of local 
school boards, which face immense political pressure to maintain 
racial boundaries.  Likewise, the rules do not give the Minnesota 
Department of Education the tools to force school districts to 
desegregate schools unless the state can prove that the district 
intended to discriminate against students of color.167
The Department’s inability to act, while not solely responsible 
for the growing racial isolation of students of color in Minnesota’s 
schools, has at least permitted this regressive trend.  Two school 
districts’ recent experiences illustrate just how ineffective the 
current rules are in promoting and enforcing pro-integrative 
decisions.  Hopkins, a Twin Cities suburban school district, 
attempted to desegregate its elementary schools but because the 
rules provided no specific guidance and did not trigger the 
Department’s involvement whatsoever, it ultimately adopted 
attendance boundaries that further segregated its schools.
  The rules 
effectively make the Department a perfunctory bureaucracy, 
dutifully collecting data and noting whether schools and districts 
are racially isolated.  The rules do not provide the Department with 
any mechanism for supporting positive, integrative action by school 
boards, and they do not give the Department any power to prevent 
decisions that effectively increase racial segregation in its schools. 
168  In 
Apple Valley, another Twin Cities suburban district, the rules did 
nothing to remedy an attendance boundary that caused children of 
color to be bused from a trailer park past several white elementary 
schools to the racially isolated elementary school.169
A. Rules Provide No Support for Integrative Boundaries: The Hopkins 
Experience 
 
School boards that choose to draw integrative school 
attendance boundaries find little support from the Department.  In 
fact, until recently, based on its reading of the rules, the 
Department “strongly discouraged” school districts from using 
racial measures in their desegregation plans and warned districts 
that “race-based measures have been successfully challenged in 
 
 167. MINN. R. 3535.0130, subp. 1 (2007). 
 168. See infra Part IV.A. 
 169. See infra Part IV.B. 
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several other states.”170  Without a state mandate to integrate, 
school districts have largely chosen to pay lip service to integration, 
while maintaining separate schools.171  Across the country, school 
boards that have chosen to integrate schools have faced immense 
opposition from communities that believe integrated schools will 
lower property values, subject white students to inferior educations, 
and drive white families out of the school district.172  Historically, 
school boards that have supported desegregation in the face of 
vocal community opposition have often not been reelected, a 
strong disincentive for board members to undertake non-mandated 
desegregation efforts.173
The lack of any mandate in Minnesota’s rules is most obvious 
when school districts need to close or open schools.  The rules do 
not give the Department the power to prevent attendance-




The Hopkins School District is a medium-sized, relatively 
affluent district located west of Minneapolis.  Like most Twin Cities 
  Without a mandate to integrate schools, and with 
parental pressure to maintain separate schools, school boards often 
simply choose the path of least resistance and redraw school 
boundaries in ways that increase segregation.  The story of the 
Hopkins School District illustrates how school districts can create 
racial segregation by bowing to public pressure and why mandatory 
integration rules are necessary to prevent continuing racially 
segregative school-boundary decisions. 
 
 170. Letter from Mary Ann Nelson, Assistant Comm’r, to John Currie, 
Superintendent, Dist. 196 n.1 (June 11, 2004) (on file with authors); letter from 
Cindy Lavorato, Assistant Comm’r, to L. Chris Richardson, Superintendent, Osseo 
Public Sch. n.1 (Feb. 4, 2000) (on file with authors); letter from Cindy Lavorato, 
Assistant Comm’r, to Carol Johnson, Superintendent, Minneapolis Sch. Dist. n.1 
(Jan. 14, 2000) (on file with the Minn. Dep’t of Educ. and the Inst. on Race and 
Poverty). 
 171. See, e.g., Thandiwe Peebles, Minneapolis Public Schools, Comprehensive 
Desegregation/Integration Plan and Budget 5 (Dec. 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.mpls.k12.mn.us/sites/f7071225-9844-4da6-96c0-
996b9c74b221/uploads/Desegregration.pdf (stating that the district is committed 
to racial integration, but refusing to consider North-South busing of students, 
even though the overwhelmingly majority of black and Latino schools on the 
north side of the city could easily be integrated with the very white schools directly 
to their south). 
 172. See E. J. K. III, White Flight as a Factor in Desegregation Remedies: A Judicial 
Recognition of Reality, 66 VA. L. REV. 961 (1980). 
 173. M. Stephen Weatherford, The Politics of School Busing: Contextual Effects and 
Community Polarization, 42 J. OF POL. 747, 747 (1980). 
 174.  See MINN. R. 3535.0130, subp. 1 (2007). 
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districts, Hopkins encompasses parts of several suburbs, ranging 
from middle-income Golden Valley to wealthier Edina and 
Minnetonka.  Like many suburban districts, Hopkins has an 
increasing population of students of color, and these students are 
concentrated in the City of Hopkins, which has one of the regions 
highest concentrations of subsidized housing units.175  In 2005, 
Hopkins’ Katherine Curren Elementary School qualified as racially 
isolated under Minnesota’s rules.176  Katherine Curren had a 
student-of-color enrollment 46% higher than the district 
elementary school average, due in part to the district’s earlier 
decision to assign students living in a new public housing 
development to this school.177  In early 2006, facing a continued 
decline in enrollment and severe budget constraints, Hopkins 
decided to close Katherine Curren and to redistribute the Curren 
students to other elementary schools.178
 
 175. Letter from Diane Cowdery, Adm’r, Hopkins Office of Equity and 
Integration, to Cindy Jackson, Minn. Dep’t of Educ. attachment 2 (June 20, 2005) 
(on file with authors).  One of the reasons student-of-color populations are 
increasing in districts like Hopkins is that the Twin Cities regional government, 
the Metropolitan Council, has done a fairly good job of locating new subsidized 
housing units in higher-income suburbs.  Myron Orfield, Nick Wallace, Eric Myott, 
and Geneva Finn, Governing the Twin Cities, in REGION: LAW, POLICY, AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE TWIN CITIES (Myron Orfield & Thomas Luce eds.) (forthcoming 
2009) (manuscript at 42, on file with authors). 
 176. Letter from Diane Cowdery, supra note 175, at 1. 
 177. Id. at 1, 2, 8.  In 1997, Minnetonka Mills, a public housing development 
was built in the attendance area of Eisenhower Elementary School in the Hopkins 
School District.  Id. at 8.  Before families moved into the complex, the school 
district decided that these students would be bused out of their local elementary 
school zone to attend Katherine Curren Elementary School.  Id.  This decision 
resulted in an influx of students of color into the small elementary school.  Id.  In 
explaining its decision, Hopkins stated, “[w]e believe the answer to the 
achievement gap lies not in the counting and moving of students from one school 
to another, but rather, in creating the conditions for equality and excellence in 
every Hopkins school.”  Id. at 2.  The school district asserted that it made the 
decision to bus the low-income students across attendance zones because of 
concerns that the incoming families would overcrowd Eisenhower Elementary 
School.  Id. at 8. 
 178. Susan Scharebroich, Hopkins Forgoes Some of Its Budget-Saving Measures; The 
Hopkins School District Stepped Back Slightly from the Aggressive Budget Cuts It Had 
Planned, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis) Dec. 27, 2006, at 16W; Jason McGrew-King, 
Enrollment Decline Means Less Revenue for Hopkins Schools, LAKESHORE WKLY. NEWS, 
Nov. 7, 2005 available at http://www.weeklynews.com/main.asp?SectionID= 
10&SubSectionID=10&ArticleID=2745.  Hopkins discovered a $600,000 shortfall in 
its budget in addition to a preexisting negative general fund balance of 
$3,3873,738.  Id.  Hopkins Sch. Bd., Meeting Minutes, Nov. 16, 2007. 
  In the wake of the school 
closing, Hopkins considered four options for redrawing school 
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attendance boundaries, the most integrative of which would have 
dramatically increased the number of students of color at Glen 
Lake Elementary, the school with the greatest concentration of 
white students and the lowest poverty level school in the district.179  
The most segregative option assigned most of the students of color 
at Alice Smith and Eisenhower Elementary, the second and third 
most racially diverse schools in Hopkins.180
A vocal group of Glen Lake parents who opposed an influx of 
minority students into their school, and a small group of Katherine 
Curren parents who had hoped to save their school, opposed the 
most integrative option.
 
181  For example, one Hopkins parent 
warned the school district that it would experience a “financial 
loss” due to losing students to open enrollment if it chose the most 
integrative option—a thinly veiled threat to remove students from 
Hopkins schools if the Board sent students of color to Glen Lake.182  
The integration rules did not mandate that the Board choose an 
integrative option.183  The school board ultimately chose the school 
attendance boundary that the vocal parents wanted, but that 
produced the least integration.184  Today, 46% of Eisenhower’s 
students are children of color, while Glen Lake, which is adjacent 
to Eisenhower, is 91% white.185  Likewise, 43% of Eisenhower’s 
students receive free or reduced lunches as compared to only 6% 
of Glen Lake’s students.186
 
 179. HOPKINS SCHOOL DISTRICT BOUNDARY TASK FORCE, BOUNDARY OPTIONS FOR 
BOARD OF EDUCATION CONSIDERATION (Feb. 2007). 
 180. Id.  Each of the four proposals, however, assigned students who lived in 
the Minnetonka Mills public housing development to Eisenhower.  Id.  Concerns 
about hazardous traffic between the school and subsidized housing, which had 
justified the discontinuous attendance boundary in 1997, were not even raised.  Id. 
 181. Transcript of Hopkins School Board Meeting of Feb. 15, 2007 (statement 
of Danny Kaplan and Brian Beek, parents) (opposing the influx of students into 
Glen Lake) (on file with authors).  Interview by Sarah Crangle with Emily Wallace-
Jackson, Katherine Curren parent (March 2007) (stating that some Katherine 
Curren parents of color opposed sending their students to a school that they 
perceived as hostile to students of color). 
 182. Transcript of Hopkins School Board Meeting of Feb. 15, 2007 (statement 
of Danny Kaplan, parent) (on file with authors). 
 183. See MINN. R. 3535.0120 (2007). 
 184. Patricia Releford, Hopkins New District Map Will Relocate the Fewest Students, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb, 21, 2007, at 3W. 
 185. Minnesota Department of Education Report Cards for Eisenhower and 
Glen Lake Elementary Schools for the 2006–2007 School Year, 
http://education.state.mn.us/ReportCard2005. 
 186. Id. 
  With this concentration of low-income 
students of color, Eisenhower’s standardized test scores are also 
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about ten points lower than Glen Lake’s in both math and 
reading.187
The Minnesota Department of Education’s Office of 
Integration/Desegregation did not officially weigh in on the battle 
in Hopkins.  In fact, there is no reason why the Department should 
have been aware of the boundary change.  While Hopkins was 
required to report its schools’ student-of-color population, it was 
not required to report potential attendance-boundary changes.
 
188  
Even if the Department had been aware of the boundary changes, 
the rules do not give the Department the power to prevent the 
drawing of segregated boundaries.  The rules only permit an after-
the-fact review of the redistricting decision, and even then, the 
Department can only step in when there is proof that the school 
district’s boundaries were motivated by a discriminatory purpose.189
B. Rules Do Not Prohibit Segregative Boundaries: The Apple Valley 
Experience 
  
The possibility of an after-the-fact review of attendance-boundary 
decisions does not provide a sufficient counterbalance to the 
community’s resistance to integration—even when school boards 
are generally supportive of integration. 
The rules’ requirement of a finding of discriminatory intent 
has effectively tied the Department’s hands.  The Department has 
never mandated that a school district change a decision that had a 
segregative effect, even when the effect is extreme and the solution 
readily apparent.  A decision by the Apple Valley School District, a 
wealthy suburban district south of Minneapolis and St. Paul, 
illustrates this fact.  The rules did not authorize the state to 
intervene even when the school district was busing elementary 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. See MINN. R. 3535.0120 (2007). 
 189. MINN. R. 3535.0130, subp. 1 (2007).  There is no evidence that Hopkins’ 
administrators intended to discriminate against students of color.  And even if they 
did, proving such discriminatory intent, which is usually unspoken and socially 
unacceptable, would be nearly impossible.  The Supreme Court has recognized 
that proving a school district’s intent may be an insurmountable task.  For 
instance, in Keyes, the seminal northern school desegregation case, the Supreme 
Court set the standard for intentional segregation in northern schools.  Keyes v. 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 206 (1972).  In Keyes, the 
Supreme Court allowed the plaintiffs to present a prima facie case of intent to 
segregate, which the defendant school district was then required to rebut with 
proof that an intent to segregate did not motivate its decision-making.  Id. 
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school children in a racially segregative manner.  Until 2007, the 
Apple Valley school district bused students from the Cedar Grove 
Manufactured Housing Park, a high-poverty neighborhood in 
Apple Valley with a disproportionate number of families of color, 
across the school district to Cedar Grove Elementary School, the 
school with the highest student-of-color population in the 
district.190  Cedar Grove students were bused past several largely 
white, high-income schools to the low-income and increasingly 
segregated Cedar Grove.191  Although the Department recognized 
that the attendance boundary was glaringly segregative and pushed 
the district to remedy the attendance boundary, the Department 
was unable to force the school district to act.192
The Department notified the district that Cedar Park 
Elementary School qualified as racially isolated under Minnesota’s 




 190. See letter from Mary Ann Nelson and Morgan Brown, Minn. Dep’t of 
Educ., to John Currie, Superintendent, Indep. Sch. Dist. 196 (Sept. 24, 2004) (on 
file with authors) (notifying the district that the Minnesota Department of 
Education was concerned about the violation of state laws and demanding 
information about the decision to draw the current attendance boundaries and 
the racial impact of the disconnected attendance boundary); letter from Morgan 
Brown, Div. of Sch. Choice & Innovation Dir., Minn. Dep’t of Educ., to Don 
Brundage & Jane Berenz, Indep. Sch. Dist. 196 (Nov. 18, 2004) (on file with 
authors) (requesting the same information as discussed supra). 
 191. Maps that show the racial composition and percentage of students who 
receive free and reduced lunch at District 196 are on file at the Institute on Race 
and Poverty.  See also letter from Alice Seagren, Comm’r of Educ., Minn. Dep’t of 
Educ., to John Currie, Superintendent, Indep. Sch. Dist. 196 (April 25, 2005) (on 
file with authors) (stating that children from the Cedar Grove trailer park were 
mostly children of color and were bused to Cedar Park, despite the fact that the 
Department found six closer elementary schools). 
 192. See e-mail from Marceline Dubose, to Cindy Jackson and Morgan Brown, 
Minn. Dep’t of Educ. (Nov. 17, 2004, 09:48 CST) (on file with authors) (stating 
that the school districts were in the process of “thinking about” attendance 
boundaries and that “[t]heir [the school district’s] background analysis of the 
causes of the racial isolation is insufficient at best”); letter from Morgan Brown, 
Div. of Sch. Choice & Innovation Dir., Minn. Dep’t of Educ., to Don Brundage 
and Jane Berenz, Indep. Sch. Dist. 196 (Nov. 18, 2004) (on file with authors) 
(stating that the Minnesota Department of Education had additional concerns 
about the Cedar Grove attendance boundary); e-mail from Sharon Peck, Program 
Finance, Minn. Dep’t of Educ., to Cindy Jackson (May 18, 2005, 02:58 CST) (on 
file with authors) (containing District 196’s unofficial school board update stating 
that the school district would begin the process of reviewing Cedar Park’s 
attendance boundary next year and stating that “[w]e rarely get this sort of 
‘meaty’ information in this type of email. (i.e., review of attendance 
boundaries).”). 
  The state required the school district 
 193. In 2004, the Board set up a community collaboration council, and 
conducted focus groups on increasing “cultural diversity” and closing the 
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to develop an integration plan that “increased interracial contact” 
between students,194 but the state, as usual, warned the district 
against remedying segregation by using “race-based measures” 
because such measures had been “successfully challenged in many 
other states.”195  The Department requested information from the 
district about the causes of the school’s racial isolation, including 
information on the noncontiguous attendance boundary, but it did 
not find a discriminatory purpose on the part of the district.196  In 
fact, the rules explicitly prohibit the Department from finding 
intentional segregation based solely on situations “when protected 
students are bused further or more frequently than white 
students.”197  The school district’s rule-mandated integration plan 
did not promise to remedy the Cedar Grove/Cedar Park 
discontinuous boundary.198
 
achievement gap.  Indep. Sch. Dist. 196, Community Collaboration Council 
Minutes, July 22, 2004–Oct. 14, 2004 (on file with the Minn. Dep’t of Educ.).  The 
collaboration council minutes do not discuss the Cedar Grove attendance 
boundaries.  Id.  
 194. Letter from Mary Ann Nelson, Assistant Comm’r Office of Academic 
Excellence, Minn. Dep’t of Educ., to John Currie, Superintendent, Indep. Sch. 
Dist. 196 (June 11, 2004) (on file with authors). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Letter from Mary Ann Nelson & Morgan Brown, Minn. Dep’t of Educ., to 
John Currie, Superintendent, Indep. Sch. Dist. 196 (Sept. 24, 2004) (on file with 
authors); letter from Morgan Brown, Div. of Sch. Choice & Innovation Dir., Minn. 
Dep’t of Educ., to Don Brundagegug & Jane Berenz, Indep. Sch. Dist. 196 (Nov. 
18, 2004) (on file with authors); Indep. Sch. Dist. 196, School Board Meeting 
Minutes (June 13, 2005) (on file with authors) (stating that the Minnesota 
Department of Education had not found intentional discrimination on the part of 
the district). 
 197. MINN. R. 3535.0130, subp. 1(D) (2007). 
 198. The whole of the district plan was to establish a task force that would 
address district boundaries over the next two years.  See Indep. Sch. Dist. 196, 
Integration/Education Equity Plan for 2004–2006 (on file with authors).  The 
plan included the following with respect to district boundaries: 
  And the district continued to bus 
• Explore all options. 
• Engage all segments of the community in a dialogue. 
• Determine solutions that are strategic, fair and equitable. 
• Establish task force to begin the 2005–06 school year to evaluate existing 
elementary attendance boundaries and issues associated with boundaries 
to include but not limited to integration. Task force will make 
recommendations to Superintendent and School Board in March or 
April of 2006. 
• Approved recommendation to be implemented for the 2006–07 school 
year. 
• Evaluation of implementation of recommendation and adjustment made 
as needed for the 2007–08 [school year]. 
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students of color past several largely white, low-poverty, high-
performing schools to Cedar Park.  Nonetheless, the Department 
approved the district’s integration plans for the next three years.199
Apple Valley eventually adopted new attendance boundaries 
that allow newly entering Cedar Grove students to attend schools 
other than Cedar Park, but there is no indication that the 
Department was able to leverage anything other than public 
opinion to pressure the district to desegregate the Cedar Grove 
Elementary School.  In the meantime, the Department awarded the 
district $2.8 million in integration aid.
  
In short, while the Department would not—and functionally could 
not—require white students to be bused to integrate schools, the 
rules also did not allow the Department to prevent segregative 
busing unless there was other evidence to support that such busing 
was the result of the school district’s racially discriminatory intent. 
200
The rules’ requirement that the Department find proof that 
the school district intentionally, discriminatorily segregated 
students—which would be a clear-cut constitutional violation—
prior to mandating district action means that the state can 
functionally do nothing about non-discriminatory segregation.  
Racial segregation and its inevitable companion, economic 
segregation, are harmful whether they result from the intentional, 
pernicious, well documented acts of school administrators or by 
accident.  Limiting the state’s remedial action to situations where 
the state and the district are liable for a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does nothing to enhance the rights of Minnesota’s 
students to an equal and equitable education.  In the end, a 
voluntary desegregation rule is only as strong as the state’s 
commitment to equality and desegregation, and the initial drive to 
desegregate schools often dries up in the face of concerted public 
opposition.  To have any real impact on the racial composition of 
public schools, states must implement comprehensive, mandatory 
 
 
Id. at 11–12. 
 199. Letter from Mary Ann Nelson, Assistant Comm’r Office of Academic 
Excellence, Minn. Dep’t of Educ., to John Currie, Superintendent, Indep. Sch. 
Dist. 196 (Aug. 29, 2005) (on file with authors) (stating approval for full 
integration funding for the 2005–2006 year); letter from Alice Seagren, Minn. 
Dep’t of Educ., to John Currie, Superintendent, Indep. Sch. Dist. 196 (April 25, 
2005) (on file with authors) (stating approval for 2005 integration revenue 
funding); Indep. Sch. Dist. 196, School Board Meeting Minutes (June 13, 2005) 
(on file with authors) (stating approval of 2004 plan). 
 200. INTEGRATION REVENUE, supra note 82, at 32. 
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integration rules that proactively require schools to prevent racial 
imbalance and promote racial diversity in their schools. 
V. STATES SHOULD MANDATE METRO-WIDE DESEGREGATION 
CONSISTENT WITH KENNEDY’S GUIDANCE IN PARENTS INVOLVED 
A strong state policy mandating integration is still possible 
after Parents Involved.  Although Kennedy joined in the Court’s 
disapproval of the particular integration plans challenged in Parents 
Involved, his concurring opinion provides specific guidance to states 
seeking to address growing racial and economic isolation in their 
schools.201  Kennedy determined that both plans were 
constitutionally deficient primarily because the districts made 
student-assignment decisions on the basis of individual racial 
classifications and could not establish that these plans were 
narrowly tailored to further any state interest.202  But Kennedy 
explicitly endorsed states’ adoption of general polices to encourage 
a diverse student body and explained that states are “free to devise 
race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way 
and without treating each student in different fashion solely on the 
basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.”203  Specifically, he 
suggested several mechanisms school boards may pursue, including 
“strategic site selection of new schools” and “drawing attendance 
zones with general recognition of the demographics of 
neighborhoods.”204  Kennedy stated that although these 
mechanisms are race-conscious, they would not prompt a strict-
scrutiny review because they “do not lead to different treatment 
based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be 
defined by race.”205  Rather, they allow decision-makers to consider 
“the impact a given approach might have on students of different 
races.”206




 201. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 
2738, 2788–97 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 202. Id. at 2790–91. 
 203. Id. at 2792. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id.  
 207. 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (barring metropolitan-wide, court-ordered 
desegregation).  
 limit the scope 
of remedies that courts may impose upon a state, these decisions 
do not address what a state, on its own initiative, may do to address 
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racial isolation in its schools, even when caused by “de facto 
segregation.”  In fact, Kennedy’s endorsement of states’ creatively 
addressing racial isolation is consistent with Milliken’s concern for 
local autonomy.208
With these specific suggestions in mind, and given its historic 
commitment to progressive policies, Minnesota should move in a 
new, more effective direction, at least with respect to the racial and 
socioeconomic composition of its public schools.  There is no 
reason why other states should not move in that direction as well.  
In particular, the rules should address all racial imbalance or 
segregation by race, no matter what its cause.  Kennedy’s opinion 
confirms that states have a compelling interest in doing so and as a 
practical matter, proving the subjective intent of collective decision-
making is nearly impossible and a waste of time and resources.
 
209
While many of the Roundtable’s proposals are worth revisiting, 
including the proposal to reduce state funding to segregated 
school districts, the proposal to create a special integration district 
for the Twin Cities Metropolitan area shows the most promise.
  
Minnesota would also benefit from reinstating its State Board of 
Education to set more enduring, less politically impacted, 
educational policy.  But even with such an entity back in place, the 
legislature could—as the Roundtable Draft did—require 
coordination and cooperation between various administrative 
agencies, including those that deal with housing, employment, and 
transportation. 
210  
In Minnesota, as in many states, segregation exists within and 
between school districts.  School districts with low concentrations of 
students of color often border school districts with high 
concentrations of students of color.211
 
 208. See id. at 741–42. 
 209. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791–93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
 210. See ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109. 
 211. This between-district segregation is highly related to residential 
segregation.  See Kendra Bischoff, School District Fragmentation and Racial Residential 
Segregation: How do Boundaries Matter?, 44 URB. AFF. REV. 182, 182–83 (2008). 
  The reality of open 
enrollment means that white students often “flee” school districts 
with high numbers of students of color to school districts with a 
larger percentage of white students, which in turn compounds 
segregation.  Moreover, when school districts attempt to integrate 
schools, white families often threaten to open-enroll their children 
outside of the school district.  After Parents Involved, it is an open 
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question whether states can limit students’ ability to participate in 
open-enrollment programs to prevent the programs from having a 
segregative effect.212  As the Roundtable recognized fifteen years 
ago, any effective desegregation plan will have to encompass the 
metropolitan region.213
Minnesota’s experiment with integration as an educational 
choice has resulted in countless missed opportunities to improve 
educational opportunities for all Minnesota children.  The state has 
failed to act as more and more schools become segregated, high-
poverty schools and then chastened these schools for their 
“achievement gap.”
  Integrated schools are possible, even after 
Parents Involved, if states adjust school district attendance 
boundaries to maximize integrated school attendance zones.  
Likewise, states can require school districts to coordinate by sharing 
students, buildings, and transportation resources to minimize costs 
and maximize integration. 
214  Segregated schooling has led, and will 
continue to lead, to a divided future of “haves” and “have-nots” as 
more low-income children and children of color never have the 
opportunity to make the social connections necessary to attain a 
middle-class future.  The state’s rationale for inaction in the face of 
glaring racial disparities has been that only intentional 
discrimination is actionable.215
As the Supreme Court recognized nearly forty years ago, 
desegregation cannot be considered merely a “choice” left up to 
  In reality, segregation harms 
children no matter what the decision-maker intended. To ensure 
an equitable future for all Minnesota’s children, the state’s mission 
must be to prevent foreseeable segregation and remedy existing 
racial imbalances, regardless of the school district’s intentions.  
 
 212. See Fisher v. U.S., No. CV 74-90 TUC DCB, 2007 WL 2410351, at *11 (D. 
Ariz. 2007).  Minnesota’s current open enrollment statute actually makes it easier 
for students to transfer out of racially isolated school districts by lifting application 
deadlines for students applying to transfer into or out of racially isolated school 
districts.  MINN. STAT. § 124D.03, subdiv. 4(b)–(c) (2006). 
 213. ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109, at 3. 
 214. See Emily Johns & James Walsh, STUDENT TEST SCORES: Slight Gains, but 
Sanctions List Grows; More Schools Will Face Federal Penalties Because They Didn’t 
Improve Enough, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 30, 2008, at A1 (quoting Alice 
Seagren, who stated that she was not satisfied with the achievement gap).  Alice 
Seagren, the current Commissioner of Education, was the head of the GOP task 
force that called for the rejection of the Roundtable rule on the claim that 
desegregation is based on ideas that have not worked in other states and will not 
work in Minnesota.  See Debra O’Connor, GOP Task Force Rejects Desegregation Plan, 
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 8, 1995, at 3B. 
 215. SONAR, supra note 101, at 50–51. 
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the individual inclinations of families and school districts.216
 
 216. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971); 
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Minnesota’s experience shows that the failure to mandate 
integration leads to growing numbers of segregated schools.  There 
is no real question that integration in education constitutes a 
compelling interest.  As our society has grown more multiracial and 
multicultural, the need for integrated schools has only grown.  At a 
minimum, students need to sit next to students from other racial 
backgrounds in the classroom in order to understand each other—
a necessary step in building a fair and equitable future. 
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